Abstract. Imagine many small devices send data to a single receiver, encrypted using the receiver's public key. Assume an adversary that has the power to adaptively corrupt a subset of these devices. Given the information obtained from these corruptions, do the ciphertexts from uncorrupted devices remain secure? Recent results suggest that conventional security notions for encryption schemes (like IND-CCA security) do not suffice in this setting. To fill this gap, the notion of security against selective-opening attacks (SOA security) has been introduced. It has been shown that lossy encryption implies SOA security against a passive, i.e., only eavesdropping and corrupting, adversary (SO-CPA). However, the known results on SOA security against an active adversary (SO-CCA) are rather limited. Namely, while there exist feasibility results, the (time and space) complexity of currently known SO-CCA secure schemes depends on the number of devices in the setting above. In this contribution, we devise a new solution to the selective opening problem that does not build on lossy encryption. Instead, we combine techniques from non-committing encryption and hash proof systems with a new technique (dubbed "cross-authentication codes") to glue several ciphertext parts together. The result is a rather practical SO-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme that does not suffer from the efficiency drawbacks of known schemes. Since we build upon hash proof systems, our scheme can be instantiated using standard number-theoretic assumptions such as decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), decisional composite residuosity (DCR), and quadratic residuosity (QR). Besides, we construct a conceptually very simple and comparatively efficient SO-CPA secure scheme from (slightly enhanced) trapdoor one-way permutations. We stress that our schemes are completely independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts, and we do not make assumptions about the underlying message distribution (beyond being efficiently samplable). In particular, we do not assume efficient conditional re-samplability of the message distribution. Hence, our schemes are secure in arbitrary settings, even if it is not known in advance how many ciphertexts might be considered for corruptions.
Introduction
The generally accepted notion of security for public-key encryption is indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA, cf. [27, 30, 16] ). For IND-CCA security, it must not be possible to tell which one of two adversarially chosen messages is encrypted, even when given access to a decryption oracle. The notion of IND-CCA security has proved extremely useful. On the one hand, it essentially captures the notion of a secure channel against active attacks (see [9, 12] ). On the other hand, efficient IND-CCA secure encryption schemes can be constructed under standard number-theoretic assumptions (e.g., [13, 26, 23] ).
However, there are realistic scenarios in which IND-CCA security is not known to provide security. For instance, consider a setting in which a large (and possibly a priori unknown) number of small devices send data to a single receiver. Each device encrypts its messages using the receiver's public key. Now assume an adversary that has the power to adaptively corrupt a subset of these devices. Say that, upon corrupting a device, the adversary learns the device's complete internal state, including the random coins used during previous encryptions. In that sense, the adversary may ask for selective openings of ciphertexts. The obvious question is: do the unopened ciphertexts remain secure? That is, can the adversary conclude anything about the plaintexts sent by uncorrupted devices, beyond of course what is implied already by the revealed plaintexts? While intuitively, the answer should be "no" for a secure public-key encryption system, IND-CCA security does not seem to be immediately useful in this setting. (E.g., [21] shows that whenever encryption constitutes a commitment to the respective message, the scheme cannot be proven secure using black-box techniques. This holds independent of whether the scheme is IND-CCA secure or not.) We clarify that the problem becomes moot if the senders can erase their randomness after sending the encrypted messages (cf. [1] ). However, reliable erasure is difficult on a real system. As such, we will only focus on solutions that do not require erasures.
So far, only little is known on the construction of public key encryption schemes that are secure under selective opening attacks (SOA secure) as discussed above. Concretely, [3, 5] have shown that every lossy encryption scheme (cf. [29] ) is SOA secure against passive (i.e., eavesdropping) adversaries. This yields a generic construction of SOA secure encryption that allows for fairly efficient instantiations. However, [3, 5] leave open the question of designing schemes that are SOA secure against active adversaries.
Our contribution. We construct practical public key encryption schemes that are SO-CCA secure, i.e., SOA secure against active attacks. Interestingly, we substantially deviate from previous techniques to obtain SOA security. To explain our approach, let us briefly sketch how [3, 5] employ lossy encryption to achieve SOA security.
(Passive) SOA security from lossy encryption. Lossy encryption schemes have the property that the scheme's "real" public key can be substituted with a "lossy" public key. Real and lossy keys are computationally indistinguishable, so -at least in a passive security experiment -this change cannot be detected by an adversary. Now lossy keys have the property that encryptions performed with them yield "lossy" ciphertexts that are statistically independent of the plaintext. In particular, a given lossy ciphertext can be -in general inefficiently -explained (or, opened) as an encryption of an arbitrary plaintext. Consequently, an SOA adversary cannot distinguish real keys, ciphertexts, and openings from those implied by lossy keys. But in the lossy case, the adversary's view is statistically independent of unopened messages; SOA security follows.
ciphertexts, but can be efficiently opened arbitrarily. 5 To achieve security against selective opening attacks, we rely on an idea from the deniable encryption scheme of Canetti et al. [11] . In their scheme, an encryption of 0 corresponds to a random string and that of 1 corresponds to a pseudorandom string (with a sparse range); it is easy to see that 1-encryptions are equivocable and can be opened as both 0 and 1. We will similar ideas in our schemes, which allows us to turn all SOA challenge ciphertexts into equivocable ones one by one. (Recall that in a sense, the reason why the lossy encryption paradigm does not mesh well with SO-CCA security is that lossy encryption only provides a handle to turn all challenge ciphertexts into lossy ones at once.) Finally, when all challenge ciphertexts are equivocable, we can argue that they do not contain any information about the unopened messages, and SOA security follows. Unlike previous constructions based on lossy encryption, we do not change the distribution of the public key in either our simulation or in the analysis.
We stress that the complexity our scheme does not depend on the number of challenge ciphertexts. So at the time of, say, constructing a PKI using our scheme, the number of potentially openable ciphertexts does not have to be known. We also remark that our approach achieves SOA security against arbitrary message distributions. We do not need to make extra assumptions on the underlying encryption scheme, or on the message distribution.
We first showcase our approach with a conceptually very simple scheme that is SO-CPA secure, i.e., SOA secure against passive attacks. Interestingly, we can base our proof upon general complexity assumptions, i.e., on the assumption of (a slightly enhanced version of) trapdoor one-way permutations. Going further, by our discussion above, NCE techniques do not necessarily suffer from the limitations of lossy encryption when it comes to active attacks. However, we have yet to describe how to handle decryption queries in the security proof, and, indeed, the simple SO-CPA secure scheme needs to be adjusted in several non-trivial ways in order to obtain our SO-CCA secure scheme.
Our scheme. In our SO-CCA secure scheme, encryption of a (multi-bit) message is performed bitwise, with one ciphertext element per bit. If the plaintext bit is 1, the corresponding ciphertext element X is an element of the language L associated with a hash proof system (HPS, cf. [14] ). If the bit is 0, the ciphertext element is a random element, which will most likely be not in L. Additionally, the ciphertext contains an authentication tag T , whose key K is the HPS key 6 associated to X in case X ∈ L (computed with the help of the witness), and a random key is taken in case X ∈ L. Decryption checks if the authentication tag T is verified correctly by the HPS keyK computed from X (by means of the HPS secret key), which is the case iff X ∈ L, i.e., 1 was encrypted. This approach is somewhat similar to the original Cramer-Shoup 5 NCE talks about openings in which secret keys, as opposed to encryption randomness, are released. As a consequence, NCE schemes are comparatively inefficient and have severe limitations (see [28] ). Our work shows that when "opening" refers to encryption randomness only, then NCE techniques allow for quite practical schemes. 6 We adopt the notation of [22, 25] to view a HPS as a key encapsulation mechanism, i.e., to call HPS instances "ciphertexts" and HPS proofs "keys."
cryptosystem ( [13, 14] ), only that the HPS keys are used for authentication and not to directly pad a message. Opening a ciphertext part as an encryption of 1 means releasing a witness for X ∈ L. Opening as an encryption of 0 means releasing the randomness used to randomly sample X. The crucial observation now is that 1-encryptions are equivocable: to open a 1-encryption as a 0-encryption, simply claim that X and K were randomly sampled, and provide the corresponding coins. Hence, equivocating all challenge ciphertexts means substituting them by all-one encryptions. This can be done as follows. For any X ∈ L, first the corresponding randomly chosen key K is replaced by the corresponding HPS key (which does not change the adversary's view due to statistical properties of the HPS), and then X is replaced by X ∈ L (which is indistinguishable to the adversary due to the assumed hardness of L).
In order to have CCA security, it is important that the above changes can be done (and argued) while at the same time being able to answer decryption queries. This is indeed the case in our construction since decryption queries can be answered with the help of the HPS secret key, while the hardness of distinguishing X ∈ L from X ∈ L holds even when given the HPS secret key.
The formal security proof uses ideas similar to those of Cramer and Shoup. We stress, however, that our proof is structured quite differently, since additional complications arise due to the fact that each ciphertext contains several X's (one for each plaintext bit), and we have several challenge ciphertexts. Due to this, it will be crucial how exactly and in which order the challenge ciphertexts are substituted by all-one encryptions. Furthermore, we need an authentication tag T that allows to "glue" together in a non-malleable way the L HPS ciphertexts X 1 , . . . , X L , obtained by encrypting an L-bit message, via their corresponding keys K 1 , . . . , K L .
Cross-authentication code. In order to "glue" HPS ciphertexts together, we make use of a new kind of information-theoretic authentication technique, which we call crossauthentication. Recall that in standard authentication, the authentication tag is computed from the message and the key, and can then be used to verify the authenticity of the message with the help of the key. In a cross-authentication code (XAC), the authentication tag is instead computed from a list K 1 , . . . , K L of keys (and there is no designated message). It should be possible to verify the correctness of the tag T with any single key K i from the list, and it should be hard for an adversary to forge a tag T that is accepted by one of the keys, even if the adversary is given all the remaining keys and a correctly computed tag T . To the best of our knowledge, this concept has not been studied before. It is an important ingredient to our construction but might also find other applications as well. We give a formal definition and propose an efficient construction.
Other related work. Dwork et al. [17] study SOA security of commitments, and provide a connection to the Fiat-Shamir methodology. Hemenway et al. [20] were the first to devise SO-CCA secure public-key encryption schemes. Their most efficient schemes have compact ciphertexts of size independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts. Yet, all their constructions follow the lossy encryption paradigm and thus suffer from the drawbacks that are inherent to that approach. Hence, unless the lossy encryption satisfies some additional property, they only prove the weaker IND-SO-CCA security notion, which in particular requires the distribution of the challenge messages to be effi-ciently conditionally re-samplable. Furthermore, the size of their public and secret keys still depends on the number of challenge ciphertexts. In contrast, our constructions are comparatively efficient, completely independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts, and do not make assumptions about the distribution of the challenge messages (beyond the usual requirement of being efficiently samplable). Bellare et al. [4] propose a (passively) SOA secure identity-based encryption scheme that is also based on NCE techniques. However, their result does not directly yield a SO-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme, say, by applying the IBE→PKE transformation of Boneh, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [8] . (In a nutshell, the reason is that [8] use a one-time signature scheme that may lose its guarantees under selective opening attacks.)
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper, k ∈ N denotes the security parameter. For a finite set X, we denote by x ← X the process of sampling x uniformly from X. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote y ← A(x; R) the process of running A on input x and with randomness R, and assigning y the result. We let R A denote the randomness space of A; we require R A to be of the form R A = {0, 1} r . We write y ← A(x) for y ← A(x; R) with uniformly chosen R ∈ R A , and we write y 1 , . . . , y m ← A(x) for y 1 ← A(x), . . . , y m ← A(x) with fresh randomness in each execution. By time A = time A (k) ∈ N∪{∞}, we denote the supremum of the running time of an algorithm A when running on security parameter k. If time A is polynomial in k, then A is PPT.
Trapdoor one-way permutations and collision resistant hashing. Informally, a trapdoor one-way permutation should be hard to invert, unless given a trapdoor.
Definition 1 (Trapdoor one-way permutation). A family of trapdoor one-way permutations F consists of three PPT algorithms Gen, Eval and Inv with the following properties. Gen(1 k ) outputs the description of a permutation f : D f → D f and a trapdoor τ , and Eval(f , x) = f (x) and Inv(τ, x) = f −1 (x) for all x ∈ D f . Furthermore, for every PPT algorithm A, the following function is negligible in k:
Note that we do not distinguish between the function f and its description output by Gen. Furthermore, to simplify notation, we usually leave the algorithms Gen, Eval and Inv implicit and write (f , f −1 ) ← F to denote that a public/secret-key pair is generated using Gen(1 k ), and we write f (x) and f −1 (x) to denote that Eval(f , x) and Inv(τ, x) are executed.
Informally, a hash function H is collision resistant if it is infeasible to find two distinct preimages x, x with H(x) = H(x ).
Definition 2 (Collision-resistant hash function). A collision-resistant hash function
H with domain D = D k and range R = R k consists of two PPT algorithms Gen and Eval with the following properties. Gen(1 k ) outputs the description of a function
Furthermore, for every PPT algorithm B, the following function is negligible in k:
Similarly to above, we do not distinguish between the function H and its description output by Gen and we usually leave the algorithms Gen and Eval implicit and write H ← H to denote that H is generated by Gen. Encryption schemes and security under selective openings. A public-key encryption scheme consists of three algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec). Key generation Gen(1 k ) outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk . Encryption Enc(pk , M ) takes a public key pk and a message M , and outputs a ciphertext C. Decryption Dec(sk , C) takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, and outputs a message M . For correctness, we want Dec(sk , C) = M for all M and all (pk , sk) ← Gen(1 k ), and with overwhelming probability over
Following [17, 21, 3, 5, 20] , we present a definition for security under selective openings that captures security of an encryption scheme under adaptive attacks. The definition is simulation-based (much like semantic security [19] ), and demands that whatever an adversary that sees a vector of ciphertexts deduces can also be deduced by a simulator that does not see any ciphertexts. To model adaptive corruptions, our notion also allows both adversary and simulator to request "openings" of adaptively selected ciphertexts. (Since the simulator does not actually get to see any ciphertexts, it may only ask to see selected components of an initially unknown message vector.) Definition 3 (SO-CPA, SO-CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is chosen-plaintext secure under selective openings (short: SO-CPA secure) iff for every polynomially bounded n = n(k) > 0, every PPT function R, and every stateful PPT machine A (the adversary), there is a stateful PPT machine S (the simulator), such that Adv cpa-so PKE,A,S,R is negligible. Here
where the experiments Exp cca-so-real PKE,A,R (k) and Exp so-ideal S,R (k) are defined as follows:
for an experiment Exp cca-so-real PKE,A,R that is defined like Exp cpa-so-real PKE,A,R , but grants the adversary (in all stages of the attack) access to a decryption oracle Dec(sk , ·). We require that A never queries Dec(sk , ·) on a challenge ciphertext C i . We say that PKE is chosenciphertext secure under selective openings (short: SO-CCA secure) if for all n, R, and A there exists S such that Adv cca-so PKE,A,S,R (k) is negligible.
A few remarks about Definition 3 are in place: -We assume that the distribution M that A outputs is encoded as a circuit that samples n-tuples of messages according to this distribution. Since A is PPT, this enforces efficient samplability of M. Efficient samplability of M is a standard and much weaker requirement than the efficient conditional re-samplability requirement from the indistinguishability-based selective opening security definitions IND-SO-ENC [3, 5] or IND-SO-CCA2 [20] . We also note that since A chooses M adaptively (i.e., dependent on pk ), SO-CCA security as defined above implies IND-CCA security (see [2] for a convenient formalization). -We stress that Definition 3 requires the specified security property to hold for any (polynomially bounded) n. This is in contrast to the schemes in [20] , in which the public key pk depends on n, so once pk is chosen, security is only guaranteed for challenge ciphertexts of bounded length. -Our notion of "opening of a ciphertext" corresponds to sender corruptions: as an opening, we release plaintext and encryption randomness, but not decryption key. While this clearly poses a significant restriction, it is in a certain sense the best we can hope for without resorting to non-black-box or non-committing encryption techniques (see [21, Section 5] ). -Like [17, 21, 3, 5, 20] , we model only one layer of adaptivity. (That is, the adversary may choose only once a subset of ciphertexts to be opened.) More realistic notions would model several stages of adaptive corruption, but would also be substantially more complicated in description and handling. We stress that our SO-CCA secure encryption scheme to be presented does not rely on the assumption of only one corruption stage. -We allow the length of the messages transmitted by the various senders to vary depending on the randomness of the message distribution M and the identity of the sender, and we provide this information (i.e. the message lengths |M 1 |, . . . , |M n |) to the simulator. Indeed, we cannot prevent the adversary from always choosing to corrupt the n/2 senders that send the longest messages.
Sender-equivocable encryption schemes. We formalize the notion of sender equivocability, which (for CPA security) is similar to non-committing encryption except the adversary is only allowed to corrupt the sender but not the receiver. In addition, we require that to equivocate, the simulator only needs to know the random coins used to generate the simulated ciphertext (and not those for the simulated public key). This latter requirement is needed because unlike the set-up for non-committing encryption, all ciphertexts are generated using the same public key in the selective opening attacks.
Definition 4 (NC-CPA, NC-CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is sender-equivocable (short: NC-CPA secure) iff there is a stateful PPT machine S (the simulator) such that for every stateful PPT machine A (the adver- 
that is defined like Exp cpa-nc-real PKE,A but grants the adversary A (in all stages of the attack) access to a decryption oracle Dec(sk , ·). We also consider an experiment Exp
, but also grants A access to Dec(sk , ·). In both experiments, we require that A never queries Dec(sk , ·) on the challenge ciphertext C. We say that PKE is chosen-ciphertext secure under selective openings (short: NC-CCA secure) if there exists S such that for all A, Adv
The next lemma says that if an encryption scheme is NC-CPA secure (resp. NC-CCA secure), then it is also SOCPA secure (resp. SOCCA secure). An analogous statement was shown in [10] in the context of non-committing encryption and adaptive corruptions; the main technical difference is that we achieve security amidst selective opening attacks with respect to a single public key.
Lemma 1 (NC-CPA security implies SO-CPA security). Suppose PKE is NC-CPA secure with simulator S. Then, for every adversary A and every function R, there exists an adversary B and a simulator S , such that
We have time S ≈ time A + n · time S + time R . Moreover, if PKE is NC-CCA secure, then we have that
with the same relation time S ≈ time A + n · time S + time R .
The proof idea is very simple: the SOCPA simulator S generates n equivocable ciphertexts independently, one for each sender and forward these ciphertexts to the adversary A. When A asks for an opening set I, S relays this set to its own experiment, receives the corresponding messages in I, and opens the ciphertexts in the simulation suitably.
Proof (sketch). We first establish the claim for NC-CPA vs SO-CPA. Here, the simulator S internally simulates a copy of A and proceeds as follows:
and output
The analysis proceeds via a series of games, where in Game j, j = 0, 1, . . . , n, the first j ciphertexts are generated using S(sim, pk ), and the corresponding randomness using S(open, pk , M i ). The last n−j ciphertexts are generated using Enc(pk , M i ; R i ) with randomness R i . We claim that the sum (over j = 1, . . . , n) of the distinguishing probabilities between Game j − 1 and Game j is bounded by nAdv cpa-nc PKE,B,S (k), where B uniformly guesses j ∈ [n], and internally simulates a copy of A as follows:
For NC-CCA vs SO-CCA, the simulator is exactly as above, except it also simulates Dec(sk , ·) which it can since it knows (pk , sk ).
3 Warmup: an NC-CPA secure scheme
We focus on constructing NC-CPA and NC-CCA secure schemes, which by Lemma 1, are respectively SO-CPA and SO-CCA secure.
Ingredients. As a warmup for our NC-CCA secure scheme, and to explain one of the key ideas, we construct an efficient NC-CPA secure scheme from a slightly enhanced version of trapdoor one-way permutations. Namely, we require that there exist algorithms for sampling the domain D f , and for explaining an arbitrary x ∈ D f as a result of sampling D f :
Definition 5 (Efficiently samplable and explainable domain). A domain D f is efficiently samplable and explainable iff there exist PPT algorithms Sample and Explain such that Sample(D f ; R) is uniformly distributed over D f for R ← R Sample , and Explain(D f , x) outputs R that is uniformly distributed subject to Sample(D f ; R) = x for any x ∈ D f .
Explainability is a vital property in the construction of non-committing encryption schemes (see Damgård and Nielsen [15] ; there, an essentially equivalent property is called "invertible sampling"). We stress that the domain of most "natural" trapdoor one-way permutations satisfies Definition 5. 7 Note that for families of trapdoor oneway permutations, explainability implies that the family is enhanced in the sense of Goldreich [18, Appendix C.1].
Hence, let F be a family of trapdoor one-way permutations f : D f → D f with efficiently samplable and explainable domain D f (for every f ∈ F), and hard-core predicate h :
It is well-known that BM is pseudorandom, even given f (x). Formally:
Theorem 1 (Blum and Micali [6] ). Let F a family of trapdoor one-way permutations
Then, for every PPT distinguisher D and every polynomially bounded = (k), the function
is negligible in k, where
The scheme. For F as above and a message space of {0, 1}, our NC-CPA secure encryption scheme NCCPA = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is defined as:
Dec(sk , C). Parse sk = f −1 and C = (y, K). Return M = 1 if BM f ,k (f −k (y)) = K, and M = 0 else. 8 Note that 1-encryptions are always correctly decrypted, while 0-encryptions are wrongly decrypted to 1 with probability 2 −k . Furthermore, larger messages can be encrypted by concatenating ciphertexts. (This does not affect NCCPA's NC-CPA security.) Equivocable ciphertexts and sketch of security proof. The key to proving NC-CPA security is that 1-encryptions are equivocable. More concretely, the NC-CPA simulator S proceeds as follows: 7 Damgård and Nielsen [15] show that any dense subset D f of an efficient samplable domain is both efficiently samplable and explainable as long as D f admits an efficient membership test. For the trapdoor permutations based on RSA, the public index is a RSA modulus N and the domain Z * N clearly satisfies these properties. For Rabin's trapdoor permutations based on modular squaring, the public index is a Blum integer N and we need to modify the domain to be the group of signed quadratic residues in Z * N . 8 Note that BM f ,k (f −k (y)) can be computed from f −1 and y alone.
-On input (sim, pk ) where pk is the public key f , it returns a random 1-encryption given by (y,
A straightforward hybrid argument to BM's pseudorandomness shows that this simulation achieves a computationally indistinguishable view for A in real experiment and ideal simulation. We obtain:
Theorem 2 (NCCPA is NC-CPA secure). For every adversary A and every function R, there exists a simulator S, and a distinguisher D, such that
We have time S ≈ time A and time D ≈ time A + time R .
We omit a more detailed proof, since the proof of Theorem 2 is similar to, but conceptually simpler than the upcoming proof for our NC-CCA secure scheme.
Relation to non-committing encryption. We point out that NCCPA can be seen as a variant of non-committing encryption schemes in [10, 24] . Compared with these schemes, our scheme is more efficient and conceptually simpler. It also allows for an unbounded usage, since we only need to provide encryption random coins (but not secret keys) upon an opening. As such, NCCPA serves as a useful tool to explain how we use equivocable ciphertexts to prove security under selective openings. The main technical difficulties lie in designing and analyzing a chosen-ciphertext secure scheme. This will turn out to be a delicate task that requires some more preparation.
Hash proof systems with explainable domains
We recall the notions of a subset membership problem and of an (extended) hash proof system, as introduced in Cramer and Shoup [14] . In our definitions, we require all properties to hold perfectly; this can be relaxed by allowing a negligibly small error probability (which includes that sampling algorithms may produce near-uniform output).
Definition 6 (Subset membership problem).
A subset membership problem SMP consists of the following PPT algorithms. System parameter generation. SysGen(1 k ) outputs system parameters ρ that defines a set X ρ of ciphertexts and a language L ρ ⊆ X ρ . X ρ is required to be efficiently recognizable (given ρ). Sampling from L ρ . SampleL(L ρ ; W ) uniformly samples X ← L ρ using randomness W . A subset membership problem SMP is called hard iff X ρ and L ρ are computationally indistinguishable. Concretely, for every PPT distinguisher D, the following function is negligible:
where in both probabilities ρ ← SysGen(1 k ).
Definition 7 (EHPS).
An extended hash proof system (short: EHPS) EHPS for a subset membership problem SMP associates with each ρ ← SysGen(1 k ) an efficiently recognizable set of keys K ρ and an efficiently recognizable set of tags T ρ , and consists of the following PPT algorithms: Individual key generation. HashGen(ρ) outputs a public key hpk and a secret key hsk .
We assume that hpk and hsk both contain ρ. Secret evaluation. SEval(hsk , X, t) computes a key K ∈ K ρ . We also write K = hsk (X, t). Public evaluation (with witness). PEval(hpk , X, W, t) computes a key K ∈ K ρ . We require correctness in the sense of PEval(hpk , X, W, t) = SEval(hsk , X, t) for all
, and all t ∈ T ρ .
By definition, in an EHPS the public key hpk uniquely determines the action of SEval for ciphertexts X ∈ L ρ . An EHPS typically becomes interesting/useful when on the other hand the action of SEval for ciphtertexts X ∈ X ρ \ L ρ is "very undetermined". We capture this as follows.
Definition 8 (2-universal
). An EHPS (for SMP) is 2-universal iff for all possible ρ ← SysGen(1 k ), all hpk in the range of HashGen(ρ), and all distinct (
where the probability is over possible hsk with (hpk , hsk ) ← HashGen(ρ).
In addition to the above (standard) properties, we will also need the following nonstandard requirements.
Definition 9 (Sparseness of the language). An subset membership problem SMP has a sparse language if for ρ ← SysGen(1 k ) and X ← X ρ , the probability that X ∈ L ρ is negligible.
Definition 10 (Explainable ciphertexts and keys). We say that a subset membership problem SMP has explainable ciphertexts if the set X ρ is efficiently samplable and explainable in the sense of Definition 5. Similarly, an extended hash proof system EHPS has explainable keys if the set K ρ is efficiently samplable and explainable.
We point out that explainable keys can actually be assumed without loss of generality, because K ρ can always be efficiently mapped into K ρ = {0, 1} m by means of a suitable (almost) balanced function, such that uniform distribution in K ρ induces (almost) uniform distribution in K ρ , and where m is linear in log(|K ρ |). The requirement on the ciphertexts to be explainable, on the other hand, is a real restriction on the SMP; nevertheless, several suitable SMPs do satisfy this requirement and have a sparse language, as we will outline next. Examples of suitable SMPs. The DDH-based SMPs from Cramer and Shoup [14] satisfy all our requirements, assuming that the platform group G is efficiently samplable and explainable in the sense of Definition 5. One popular such group in which DDH is assumed to be hard is the unique q-order subgroup of Z * p , where p = 2q + 1 is a safe prime. Another one is the elliptic curve G 1 from [7, Section 5.1]. The Paillier-based SMP from [14] fulfils our requirements as well. Finally, the SMP from [14] based on quadratic residuosity satisfies all our requirements except for a sparse language (Definition 9). However, the SMP that consists of, say, k parallel copies of the QR SMP from [14] (and where the EHPS key is the product of the individual keys) has a sparse language and satisfies our remaining requirements.
Cross-authentication codes
We introduce here a new information-theoretic authentication technique, which will play an important role in our construction of a SO-CCA-secure encryption scheme. However, the technique may also be useful in other contexts. Cross-authentication, as we call our technique, allows to compute an authentication tag T for a list K 1 , . . . , K L of keys, with the following two properties. The tag T can be verified by any single key K i from the list, and without knowledge of K i it is information-theoretically hard to forge a tag T that is correctly verified by K i , even when given a correctly computed tag T and all the other keys
Below is the formal definition followed by an efficient example construction.
code (short: L-XAC) XAC consists of a key space XK and a tag space XT and of three PPT algorithms XGen, XAuth and XVer. XGen(1 k ) produces a uniformly random key K ∈ XK, XAuth(K 1 , . . . , K L ) outputs a tag T ∈ XT , and XVer(K, i, T ) outputs a decision bit. The following is required: Correctness. For all i ∈ [L], the probability
is negligible, where K 1 , . . . , K L ← XGen(1 k ) in the probability. Security against impersonation and substitution attacks. Adv imp XAC (k) and Adv sub XAC (k) as defined below are both negligible:
where the max is over all i ∈ [L] and T ∈ XT , and
L−1 and all (possibly randomized) functions F : XT → XT .
Note that by taking R XGen as key space, instead of XK, we may without loss of generality assume that XK is of the form XK = {0, 1} r (and XGen simply outputs its randomness).
Example of a L-XAC. Let F be a finite field of size q, where q depends on k (e.g. q = 2 k ). Set XK = F 2 and XT = F L ∪ {⊥}, and let XGen produce a random key in
T can be computed efficiently by solving the linear equation system AT = B, where A ∈ F L×L is the Vandermonde matrix whose i-th row is given by 1, a i , a Lemma 2. The above L-XAC XAC satisfies:
is well known to be non-zero unless a i = a j for some i = j, where the latter happens with probability at most (a 1 , b 1 
. We may assume those a i 's to be pairwise distinct, since otherwise T will be ⊥ for any choice of K L and then the probability of finding T that is accepted by K L is upper bounded by Adv imp XAC (k). We first slightly modify the computation of T as follows. Instead of setting T to ⊥ as soon as det(A) = 0, we distinguish between the case where AT = B has no solution and where it has multiple solutions for T . In the former case, T is still set to ⊥, but in the latter, T is chosen uniformly at random from all the solutions. Note that this modification makes the computation of T randomized (at least in general), but the definition of Adv sub XAC (k) still makes sense. This modification changes the value of Adv sub XAC (k) by at most ε multi = Pr [AT = B has multiple solutions ], where the probability is over the choice of K L .
In the following argument, we consider the above modified version of XAC. The probability Adv sub XAC (k) is upper bounded by the corresponding probability conditioned on T = ⊥ plus the probability that T = ⊥. Since the latter probability equals ε no = Pr [AT = B has no solution ], we can focus on the former while book-keeping the "error" accumulated so far:
In the following argument, we consider an arbitrary T = ⊥, and we consider the corresponding (conditional) probability distribution of K L . It holds that
This in particular implies that a L on its own is uniformly distributed. Consider now an arbitrary choice for T ∈ XT (computed from K 1 , . . . , K L−1 and T ). T is required to be different from T , and we may assume that T = ⊥, since otherwise XVer(K, L, T ) = 0 holds with certainty. By linearity,
However, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, p T −T (a L ) = 0 holds with probability at
Taking into account ε multi and ε no from further up, this proves the claim.
6 Our NC-CCA secure scheme Ingredients. For our encryption scheme with message space {0, 1}
L , we need the following.
1. A hard subset membership problem SMP with sparse language L ρ and explainable ciphertexts X ρ . 2. A 2-universal extended hash proof system EHPS for SMP with tags T ρ and explainable keys K ρ .
A collision-resistant hash function H with domain (X ρ )
L and range T ρ . 4. An L-cross-authentication code XAC with key space XK = K ρ and tag space XT .
From the remarks after Definition 10 and 11 it follows that the efficient samplability and explainability of K ρ and the requirement on XK to coincide with K ρ pose no real restriction. In fact, all of these ingredients exist under standard number-theoretic assumptions such as decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), decisional composite residuosity (DCR), and quadratic residuosity (QR). The scheme. We define our encryption scheme NCCCA = (Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
and H ← H. Return public key pk = (hpk , H) and secret key sk = (hsk , H).
,
, set the keys
and compute the tag T := XAuth(
Lemma 3 (Correctness of NCCCA). For any pk in the range of Gen, any M , and any C ← Enc(pk , M ), we have Dec(sk , C) = M except with probability at most
by completeness of EHPS, and so XVer(K i , i, T ) = 1 except with probability fail XAC (k) by correctness of XAC. On the other hand, for M i = 0, EHPS's universality implies that
is uniformly random, even given pk , C, and M . Hence, the proba-
The statement follows by a union bound over i ∈ [L].
Equivocable ciphertexts. As with our earlier scheme NCCPA, NCCCA has the property that 1-encryptions are equivocable. Specifically, we can construct a NC-CCA simulator S that proceeds as follows:
where pk is the public key (hpk , H), it generates an equivocable ciphertext of the form
for uniformly chosen W i ∈ R SampleL and T := XAuth(
L , such a C can be explained as an encryption of M by releasing
Our security proof shows that equivocated ciphertexts and their openings are indistinguishable from authentic ones, even given a decryption oracle.
Security analysis
Theorem 3 (NCCCA is NC-CCA secure). There exists a simulator S such that for every adversary A there exists a subset membership distinguisher D and an adversary B on H's collision resistance property such that time D , time B ≈ time A and Before going into the formal proof below, we briefly give a high-level description of the reasoning. The goal is to replace the challenge ciphertext by an equivocable ciphertext. We replace the challenge ciphertexts as follows, one-by-one for every X * m (that is not already in L ρ ) within every challenge ciphertext C * . First, instead of choosing the corresponding key K * m at random whenever M m = 0, K * m is always computed as
We now briefly argue why these modifications do not (significantly) alter the adversary A's view. In order to argue that the modification to the choice of K * m does not change A's view, it is crucial that A has no information on the HPS secret key hsk beyond the public key hpk . In order to guarantee this, we first slightly modify the decryption procedure Dec used to answer the decryption queries so that Dec does not make any use of hsk : rather than verifying the XAC tag T i , the decrypted message bit M i is directly set to 0 whenever X i ∈ L ρ . By universality of the hash proof system and the security of XAC against impersonation attacks, it follows that this modification does not significantly change A's view. Note that with this modified decryption procedure, the resulting game is not efficient anymore, but this fine for arguing that choosing K * m as HPS key instead of random does not change A's view, since this is an information-theoretic argument. However, this step would be a problem for justifying the switch from X * m ∈ L ρ to X * m ∈ L ρ . Therefore, before doing the latter switch, the modified decryption procedure is replaced again by the original procedure Dec. Again, this change to the decryption procedure can be argued to have little effect on A's view by universality of the hash proof system and security of XAC. However, in this case things are slightly more subtle because if X i = X * m and t = t * , then A now knows an XAC tag that is verified by the HPS key K i = hsk (X i , t), namely T * . But if indeed t = t * then the collision resistance of H ensures that A has to submit a different XAC tag. Hence security against substitution attacks of XAC ensures that the tag will be rejected. Thus both decryption processes decrypt to the same message bit and are hence indistinguishable.
Proof. We proceed in a series of games. Generally, we will denote the output of Game i by out i .
Game −2 is the original real experiment Exp cca-nc-real NCCCA,A . By definition,
Let M * = (M * 1 , . . . , M * ) denote the message chosen by A; C * be the challenge ciphertext handed to A; and C j be A's j-th decryption query. Write
, and similarly for the variables t * , K j i , etc. Without loss of generality, we assume that A always makes q = q(k) decryption queries.
In Game −1, we abort the experiment (with output 1) as soon as
A counting argument and a union bound show
In Game 0, we abort the experiment (with output 1) as soon as A submits a decryption query C j with
for some . A straightforward reduction shows that
for a suitable B that simulates Game 0. Game m.1 is identical to Game m above. In Game m.2, we slightly modify the decryption oracle. Recall that from each EHPS ciphertext X i of a decryption query C, a key K i = hsk (X i , t) is computed and M i := XVer(K i , i, T ) is returned. We change this to 
Note that the adversary's view in Game m.2 depends only on hpk . Namely, while the experiment uses hsk to decrypt consistent EHPS ciphertexts efficiently, by completeness of EHPS, this does not release any information on hsk beyond hpk . In Game m. 
In Game m.4, we reverse the changes from Game m.2. That is, decryption does not set M i := 1 iff X i ∈ L ρ , but again computes M i := XVer(K i , i, T ). Note that this makes Game m.4 efficient again.
Let bad m.3 denote the event that in Game m.3, there is a EHPS ciphertext X i in some C j that is inconsistent in the sense X i / ∈ L ρ , but XVer(K i 
Combining (6, 7, 8, 13, 14) finishes the proof.
We catch up with the proofs of the two technical lemmas:
Proof (of Lemma 4). Let bad m.2.j.i denote the event that in Game m.2, the EHPS ciphertext X i in some C j is inconsistent in the sense X i / ∈ L ρ , but XVer(K 
